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a b s t r a c t
Sharing helps children form and maintain relationships with other children. Yet, children born today
interact not only with other children, but increasingly with robots as well. Little is known on whether
and how children treat robots as recipients of prosocial acts. We thus investigated children’s sharing
behavior towards robots. Specifically, we assessed the effect of anthropomorphic appearance and
affective state attributions. Children (4–9 years old; n = 120) were introduced to robots that varied
in the extent to which they looked human-like. Children’s perceptions of the robots’ affective states
were manipulated by explicitly demonstrating one robot as having feelings and the other one not.
Subsequently, children’s sharing behavior towards and feelings about sharing with these robots were
measured. Results indicate that there was no effect of anthropomorphic appearance on sharing
behavior. However, importantly, children in both age groups shared more resources with a robot that
they attributed with affective states, and expressed more positive emotional judgments about sharing
with that robot as well. An exploratory mediation analysis further revealed that children’s positive
feelings about sharing guided their actual sharing behavior with robots. In sum, children show more
pro-social behavior when they believe a robot can feel.
© 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Sharing is an important part of children’s daily lives, helping
them form and maintain relationships with other children from
an early age (Caputi, Lecce, Pagnin, & Banerjee, 2012; Dirks,
Dunfield, & Recchia, 2020; Laursen & Hartup, 2002). While the de-
velopment of children’s sharing behavior has received extensive
attention in the literature (for reviews see Kuhlmeier, Dunfield,
& O‘Neill, 2014; Martin & Olson, 2015), one contemporary as-
pect has not been acknowledged until now: children growing
up today are not just interacting with other children and adults,
they are also faced with a multitude of technological and dig-
ital agents, including robots. Robots are starting to appear in
children’s daily lives as household tools, toys, and educational
assistants (e.g., Fridin, 2014; Kory Westlund et al., 2017; Yu &
✩ Acknowledgments: We thank Kim Lien van der Schans for her help with
stimuli creation and Milou Huijsmans for her assistance with data collection.
We thank Jellie Sierksma and Tessa Lansu for their helpful comments on earlier
versions of this manuscript. Lastly, we would like to thank all the schools
that participated in this research for welcoming us into their classrooms. This
research was funded by Jacobs Foundation, Germany Grant 2014-1155.
∗ Correspondence to: Behavioural Science Institute, Radboud University
Nijmegen, P.O. Box 9104, 6500 HE, Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
E-mail address: S.Nijssen@psych.ru.nl (S.R.R. Nijssen).
Roque, 2019) and it is predicted that their presence at home
and in the classroom will increase rapidly in the next years
(International Federation of Robotics, 2019). As children will start
to encounter robots more often, this leads to the important ques-
tion: How do children treat robots in social contexts and do they
emotionally connect to robots? Given the relevance of prosocial
and sharing behavior for children (Caputi et al., 2012; Dirks
et al., 2020), the intriguing question arises: does children’s shar-
ing behavior extend to robots? And what factors affect children’s
sharing towards robots: is this related to certain aspects of a
robot’s appearance or behavior?
1.1. Anthropomorphism
A central factor mediating children’s behavior towards robots
is anthropomorphism: the tendency to attribute affective states
to non-living objects (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007; Weisman,
Markman, & Dweck, 2015). Children tend to anthropomorphize
more than adults, and will often act towards inanimate objects,
such as puppets or teddy bears, as if they were alive (e.g., Fawcett
& Markson, 2010). Anthropomorphism can be induced bottom-
up, through an object’s appearance or movement (e.g., a robot
having eyes; Heider & Simmel, 1944; Kühn, Brick, Müller, &
Gallinat, 2014). For example, Sommer and colleagues found that
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijcci.2021.100319
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children tend to award humanoid robots more moral status than
animaloid robots (Sommer et al., 2019). In addition, anthropo-
morphism may arise top-down, from holding anthropomorphic
beliefs (e.g., simply ‘knowing’ that a robot feels pain when it
falls off a table, Nijssen, Müller, van Baaren, & Paulus, 2019;
Stenzel et al., 2012). Such anthropomorphic beliefs may originate
in young children’s anthropocentric world-view: reasoning that,
when something moves or talks like they do, it must mean
it experiences the world in exactly the same way as they do
(Piaget & Inhelder, 1969). According to the model of conceptual
change, and in line with current predictive coding approaches
(Clark, 2013; Friston, 2003), anthropomorphic beliefs decrease
by accumulating experiences throughout development (i.e., with
age) or explicit knowledge instruction (Carey, 1985; Springer &
Keil, 1989).
Indeed, if we look at existing literature on children’s per-
ceptions of robots, empirical evidence can be found for both
maturation as well as explicit knowledge instruction as deter-
minants for children’s anthropomorphic beliefs. 12- and 15-year
olds have been found to show less moral care towards robots
than 9-year olds (Kahn, Freier, Severson, & Gill, 2012). Similarly,
7-year olds were found to have a more nuanced understanding
of the ‘alive’ status of a robot than 4-year olds (Bernstein &
Crowley, 2008). Results reported by Sommer et al. (2019) sug-
gest that these age differences may be mediated by a decrease
in anthropomorphic mental state attributions. However, explicit
instructions about the absence or presence of certain human-
like qualities in robots (e.g., the ability to move autonomously
versus being remote-controlled) have been found to matter too.
Regardless of age, children between the ages of 4 and 8 all
ascribed fewer anthropomorphic qualities to a remote-controlled
versus autonomous robot (Chernyak & Gary, 2016) and deemed a
robot ascribed with affective capacities as more suitable for moral
decision-making than one without affective capacities (Danovitch
& Keil, 2008). In sum, children’s anthropomorphic tendencies of
robots appear to be shaped by maturation as well as the extent
to which they have experience with or knowledge of that robot.
Taken together, top-down anthropomorphic beliefs and
bottom-up anthropomorphic appearance affect children’s per-
ceptions of robots. Moreover, current theories highlight a close
link between anthropomorphism and other-oriented behavior
(Waytz, Epley, & Cacioppo, 2010). For example, adults show more
moral concern towards robots when they believe a robot can
feel (Nijssen et al., 2019) or when it looks more human-like
(Riek, Rabinowitch, Chakrabarti, & Robinson, 2008). The present
research thus investigated whether anthropomorphic attributions
influenced children’s sharing behavior towards robots.
1.2. Sharing behavior
Just as anthropomorphic attributions may induce us to show
other-oriented behavior towards robots, children’s sharing with
other humans is strongly tied to perceived positive affect and
understanding of affective states (e.g., Hammond & Drummond,
2019; Izard et al., 2001). When children share, they voluntar-
ily give away resources to one or more recipients (e.g., Aknin,
Hamlin, & Dunn, 2012; Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, 2013). One central
aspect of sharing is the extent to which children anticipate the re-
cipient to be happy with the shared resources (Decety & Svetlova,
2012; Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989). This notion has received ex-
tensive empirical support, as children were found to share more
of their own resources with another child when they anticipated
the recipient to be happier with the decision (Paulus & Moore,
2015), or when they empathized more with her (Eggum et al.,
2011; Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; Williams, O’Driscoll,
& Moore, 2014). Children’s own feelings about sharing matter
too (Ongley & Malti, 2014; Sabato & Kogut, 2019). Most notably,
already young children feel happier about sharing items (Aknin
et al., 2012; Kogut, 2012) and preschoolers anticipate positive
emotions when sharing (Paulus & Moore, 2017). Thus, children’s
developing understanding and attributions of emotional states
play an important role in the ontogeny of sharing (for review see
Imuta, Henry, Slaughter, Selcuk, & Ruffman, 2016). Based on what
we know about the role of emotions and emotion attribution in
children’s sharing with other humans, this mechanism might play
a role in their sharing with non-human agents as well.
The links between perceived positive affect and pro-social
behavior as well as between anthropomorphism and concern
for others open up the intriguing possibility that children show
sharing behavior towards robots when they perceive them as
having feelings. The current study combined these two strands of
research and aimed at assessing the contribution of these factors
to children’s sharing behavior towards robots.
1.3. The current study
The current study investigated the factors that influence chil-
dren’s sharing behavior towards robots. In particular, the current
research focused on the effect of anthropomorphic beliefs and
anthropomorphic appearance on children’s sharing behavior to-
wards robots. Preschoolers (4–5 year olds) and second graders (8–
9 year olds) were introduced to two different robots via videos in
which children’s (top-down) anthropomorphic emotion attribu-
tions to the robots were manipulated. One robot was introduced
as being able to experience affective states, such as feeling happy
and sad, and one was not. Between participants, we additionally
varied the extent to which the robots had human-like visual
features to assess the (bottom-up) effect of anthropomorphic
appearance. Subsequently, children’s sharing behavior towards
each robot and their emotional state were assessed using three
different experimental tasks to capture different dimensions of
sharing.
Recent developmental research has used different experi-
mental paradigms to measure children’s sharing behavior. For
example, a distinction can be made between costly and non-
costly sharing. First, a costly paradigm derived from behavioral
economics is the mini dictator game in which a child decides
whether or not to share some of their own resources (e.g., Fehr,
Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008, Gummerum, Hanoch, Keller, Par-
sons, & Hummel, 2010). This task is thus costly for the child, as
giving their own resources away comes at a cost to the child.
Second, an often-used non-costly paradigm is the resource distri-
bution task in which a child is presented with a set of resources
that are not their own, and is asked to distribute those resources
between recipients (e.g., Baumard, Mascaro, & Chevallier, 2012;
Kenward & Dahl, 2011). To capture children’s sharing both in a
costly and non-costly setting, the current study thus used both
a mini dictator game and a resource distribution task. With the
mini dictator paradigm, the particularly interesting and relevant
question can be investigated under which conditions children
engage in costly sharing with a robot. Under which circumstances
would they be more likely to give up their own resources in order
to share with a robot? In addition, given that young children are
less likely to engage in costly-sharing (Smith, Blake, & Harris,
2013), we included the non-costly distribution task between the
two robots as a more sensitive measure whether affective states
make a difference and children treat the robots differently.
Importantly, children’s feelings about sharing form an impor-
tant component of sharing behavior (Aknin et al., 2012; Kogut,
2012; Paulus & Moore, 2017). Thus, in order to gain a full un-
derstanding of the psychological processes that lead children to
share with robots, it would be pertinent to assess children’s
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feelings about sharing with robots. To this end, we incorporated
a novel emotional judgment task in which children’s feelings
about sharing with someone relative to keeping resources for
themselves can be measured.
Lastly, to assess the effect of our manipulation on children’s
anthropomorphic attributions regarding the two robots in the
study, an anthropomorphism questionnaire was included. We
hypothesized that children would share more resources with a
human-like versus a mechanical robot, as well as with a robot
that was attributed with affective states versus one that was
described in non-affective terms. We additionally expected chil-
dren to feel happier about sharing resources with a human-like
versus a mechanical robot, and with an affective versus a non-
affective robot. We lastly expected a developmental difference
in the sensitivity to our manipulation between younger (pre-
school aged) and older (second grade) children. In the literature
on children’s perceptions of robots, both effects of maturation
(e.g., Sommer et al., 2019) as well as knowledge (e.g., Danovitch &
Keil, 2008) have been reported. We thus expected older children’s
sharing behavior and feelings about sharing to be more affected
by the knowledge of a robot having affective states or not than
younger children.
2. Materials and method
2.1. Participants
Power analysis using G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, &
Buchner, 2007) using an a priori power estimate of 1-β = .80
and an estimated effect size of f = .25 (medium effect size, see
Faul et al., 2007) for an interaction between anthropomorphic
appearance and affective state attribution revealed a minimum
required sample size of n = 54 per age group, thus n = 108
in total. To account for attrition, n = 129 children from seven
different schools in the Netherlands were recruited to participate.
Nine preschoolers were tested but excluded from data analysis
(n = 8 for failing to pass the attention check, n = 1 for failing to
understand the Facial Affective Scale; see below). The final sample
thus consisted of n = 120 children; 57 preschoolers (Mage = 4.90
± 0.42 years, 22 girls) and 63 second-graders (Mage = 8.35
± 0.50 years, 31 girls). All participants were typically devel-
oping children. Data regarding ethnicity were not collected for
GDPR considerations. For the same reason, no data regarding
parents’ socioeconomic background was collected. However, to
keep the sample as homogeneous as possible in terms of SES,
only primary schools in the southwest of the Netherlands were
recruited to participate in the study. The primary schools that
participated were located in towns with comparable average SES.
All parents provided active informed consent prior to the child’s
participation. The experimental procedure was approved by the
institutional review board of the affiliated university.
2.2. Design and materials1
The study consisted of a 2 (Age group: preschoolers versus
second graders; between-subjects) by 2 (Anthropomorphic ap-
pearance: humanoid versus mechanical robot; between-subjects)
by 2 (Affective states: robot with affective states versus robot
without affective states; within-subjects) mixed design.
1 All materials are available on the Open Science Framework.
2.2.1. Robot videos
To vary the level of anthropomorphic appearance of the robots
children encountered, two sets of videos were created: one with
Softbank Robotics NAO robots (for the Humanoid condition) and
one with LEGO Mindstorms robots (for the Mechanical condition;
Fig. 1). Videos were created with the purpose of manipulating
participants’ attributions of the robots’ affective states. Manipu-
lating children’s perceptions by means of videos is easier because
it is the researcher who talks to the robot, and therefore has
control over what the dialog will be about. Thus, it allows the
researcher to use the same stimulus across participants, whereas
real-life interactions with robots would lead to a lot of variation.
Given that children’s perceptions of robots were the central vari-
able of the current study, we thus decided to create videos instead
of facilitating real-life interactions (e.g., Danovitch & Keil, 2008;
Sommer et al., 2019). Each participant saw two videos: one of
a robot that demonstrated having feelings, and one of a robot
that did not have this capacity. Videos were approximately 1 min
in length and consisted of a female human confederate asking
each robot two questions: one related to its cognitive capacity
(e.g., ‘‘Can you count to 4?’’) and the other to its affective states
(e.g., ‘‘What makes you happy?’’). Both robots displayed cognitive
skills in response to the first question (by counting to four), but
only the affective robot was displayed as having affective states
in response to the second question (‘‘I love playing with kids and
other robots’’ versus ‘‘I don’t know, because I cannot feel happy
or sad’’; as in Danovitch & Keil, 2008). The two humanoid robots
differed in color (orange or blue); the two mechanical robots
differed in physical attributes (grasping arm or wheels). The color
(in the Humanoid condition) and shape (in the Mechanical con-
dition) were counterbalanced. The human confederate was the
same in all videos. A 13’’ laptop was used to show the videos to
participants.
2.2.2. Attention check and manipulation check
To make sure participants paid attention to the robot videos,
two questions were asked right after each video was presented:
‘‘Which color/shape did the robot have?’’ and ‘‘Was the robot able
to have feelings, like happy or sad?’’. Notably, all participants
who failed the attention check (n = 8, all preschoolers) did so
because they overattributed affective states: they indicated both
robots were able to have feelings irrespective of the priming
video. To assess the effect of our manipulation on children’s an-
thropomorphic attributions to both robots, an anthropomorphism
questionnaire was included at the end of the experiment. The
questionnaire consisted of two items about each robot’s affective
states regarding its physical sentience (e.g., ‘‘If the robot falls on
the floor, does it feel pain?’’), two items about its affective states
regarding its emotional sentience (e.g., ‘‘If someone is mean to
the robot, is the robot sad?’’), and one classification item in which
children had to decide who the robot resembled most: a child or
a teddy bear (Chernyak & Gary, 2016). All items required a binary
response.
2.2.3. Emotional judgment task
As resources in the emotional judgment task, colored balloons
were used. In addition, pictures of the robots (see above) were
presented alongside the balloons to make recipients more salient
during the task. The Facial Affective Scale (FAS; McGrath, 1985, as
cited in Williams et al., 2014) was employed to assess children’s
emotion ratings. The FAS consisted of five schematic faces ranging
from extremely happy to extremely sad with a neutral face at
the center. Children were instructed to use these faces to indicate
how they would feel in certain situations.
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Fig. 1. Mechanical (left) and humanoid (right) robots employed in this experiment.
2.2.4. Mini dictator game
As resources in the mini dictator game, colored smiley stickers
were used. Stickers are commonly used as resource in the mini
dictator game paradigm as children tend to value them highly
(e.g., Gummerum et al., 2010; Moore, 2009). A small cardboard
box was used as the robot’s recipient box, and a picture of the
robot was stuck on top of box to reinforce the recipient’s salience
during the task.
2.2.5. Resource distribution task
In the resource distribution task, stickers were used for chil-
dren to distribute between recipients. To distinguish between this
task and the mini dictator game, star-shaped stickers were used.
In addition, both robots’ recipient boxes (the same ones as in the
mini dictator game) were presented alongside one another for
children to put stickers in.
2.3. Procedure
The study was conducted in Dutch; any part of the experimen-
tal script presented here was translated to English. Participants
were randomly assigned to the Humanoid or Mechanical con-
dition. The study consisted of two experimental blocks, each
starting with a video of one of the robots followed by a series
of experimental tasks relating to the robot. This procedure was
repeated for the second robot.
The experiment was conducted in a quiet environment inside
the school (e.g., an empty classroom). Participants were seated
behind a table across from the experimenter. Before starting with
the experimental tasks, participants were introduced to the Facial
Affective Scale that was used in the emotional judgment task. If
a participant failed to comprehend the FAS, they were excluded
from further participation. After familiarization with the FAS, the
first experimental block started.
A laptop was placed in front of the participant and the first
robot video was presented. The order in which the robot videos
(affective versus non-affective) were presented was counterbal-
anced. After watching the video, two control questions were
asked as attention and manipulation check: ‘‘Which color/shape
did the robot have?’’ and ‘‘Was the robot able to have feelings, like
happy or sad?’’. If the participant responded incorrectly to one
of these questions, the video was shown again; if the participant
again failed to answer correctly, they were excluded from further
participation.2
After watching the video and correctly answering the control
items, the participant completed two short tasks regarding the
robot.3 First, in the emotional judgment task (following Paulus &
Moore, 2015), the experimenter placed two balloons in front of
the child; once, they were told that they were allowed to keep
both balloons for themselves (non-sharing scenario), and once,
they were told that they would share one of the two balloons
with the robot they just saw in the video (sharing scenario). In the
sharing scenario, the participant was asked to indicate how they
felt about sharing a balloon with the robot by pointing to one of
the faces in the FAS. In the non-sharing scenario, the participant
was asked how they felt about keeping both balloons for them-
selves by again pointing to one of the faces in the FAS. The order
of the sharing and non-sharing scenario was counterbalanced.
After the emotional judgment task, children participated in a
mini dictator game. Children were presented with a set of 20
smiley stickers and were told that they could select 6 stickers
to take home with them. After the participant had selected six
stickers and confirmed they liked those best, the robot’s recipient
box was placed in front of the participant. The experimenter told
the participant that the robot did not have any stickers, and that
the child could decide whether she wanted to donate some of
her stickers to the robot. The experimenter emphasized that the
child was free to choose for themselves and announced she would
turn away while the child was deciding to give away stickers or
not, so she could not see what the child was doing. Thus, as the
child decided whether to donate or not, the experimenter turned
away and rummaged through some documents to emphasize
the child’s privacy in the decision. If the participant decided to
donate stickers to the recipient, they could place the stickers into
the recipient’s box. The remaining stickers were put in a small
envelope and given to the child to take home. The video of the
2 ‘‘Excluded’’ in this context means that children’s data were not included
in the final analysis. When children responded incorrectly to the attention
check, they received positive feedback about their participation (‘‘Well done, you
finished the task already!’’) and were also allowed to pick out stickers — just
like the children who completed the entire study.
3 One additional task was included for second-graders as a pilot task for
another study; since the task is beyond the scope of this paper, it is not discussed
here.
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second robot was then shown, and the emotional judgment task
and mini dictator game were repeated for the second robot.
Upon finishing the second block, participants were presented
with two final tasks. First, a resource distribution task was used
to assess children’s sharing behavior in a non-costly setting;
i.e., when they did not have to decide about sharing their own
resources. Both robots’ recipient boxes were placed in front of
the participant as well as 6 stickers. The participant was asked to
decide how many of the stickers they wanted to give to the af-
fective and non-affective robot by putting them in the boxes. The
number of donated stickers was recorded for each robot. Since
6 stickers can hypothetically be divided equally, and it is known
that children have a strong preference for fair distributions (Fehr
et al., 2008; Rakoczy, Kaufmann, & Lohse, 2016), we also wanted
to assess their donating behavior when the number of stickers
forced them to prefer one robot over the other. Thus, for a random
half of the sample, a second distribution trial was added: the
experimenter first removed all 6 stickers from the boxes and put
them aside. Then, the experimenter got out 5 star-shaped stickers
and asked the child again how many stickers they would give to
each robot. Thus, distributing them evenly between the robots
was not an option anymore and children had to decide which
robot would get more stickers than the other. Again, the number
of stickers donated to each robot was recorded.
Lastly, all participants completed a short anthropomorphism
questionnaire to assess whether our manipulation indeed af-
fected children’s anthropomorphic attributions to the two robots.
Upon completion of the anthropomorphism questionnaire, chil-
dren were thanked for their participation and guided back to their
classroom.
2.4. Data coding and analysis
2.4.1. Emotional judgment task
Children’s ratings in the EJT were coded on a scale from 1
(representing the saddest face) to 5 (representing the happiest
face). Emotion ratings were recorded for the sharing and non-
sharing scenario separately. Ratings in the sharing scenario were
subtracted from the non-sharing scenario to calculate an Emotion
Rating Difference (ERD) score. The ERD score served as an index
for whether a child felt more or less positive about sharing
resources versus being allowed to keep items for themselves. A
score of 0 thus reflected no difference in emotion about shar-
ing, while a positive score meant that the child felt happier
when sharing than when keeping resources for themselves, and
a negative score meant that the child felt happier about keeping
items for themselves rather than sharing them. ERD scores were
analyzed using a mixed repeated-measures ANOVA including the
factors Affective states (robot with affective states versus robot
without affective states; within-subjects), Anthropomorphic ap-
pearance (mechanical versus humanoid; between-subjects), and
Age (preschoolers versus second-graders; between-subjects). In
addition, to test whether ERD scores were truly positive or nega-
tive (i.e., whether they significantly differed from 0), one-sample
t-tests were conducted comparing the mean ERD scores in the
two different Affective state conditions for each age group sep-
arately. If the mean ERD score would be significantly higher
than 0, this would mean that children on average felt happier
when sharing their resources with a robot than when having
to keep their resources for themselves. Vice versa, if the mean
ERD score would be significantly lower than 0, this would mean
children on average felt happier when they kept the resources
for themselves instead of sharing them with the robot. A score
not significantly different from 0 would suggest that children
reported similar affect for sharing versus keeping resources for
themselves. Bonferroni corrections were applied within-subjects.
2.4.2. Mini dictator game
The number of stickers a child donated to each robot was
recorded. These data were analyzed with a mixed repeated-
measures ANOVA, including the factors Affective states (robot
with affective states versus robot without affective states; within-
subjects), Anthropomorphic appearance (mechanical versus hu-
manoid; between-subjects), and Age (preschoolers versus
second-graders; between-subjects).
Additionally, as an exploratory analysis, we investigated
whether the effect of Affective states on the number of shared
stickers in the mini dictator game was mediated by ERD scores.
A within-participant mediation analysis was conducted using
MEMORE package in SPSS with 10000 bootstrap samples (Mon-
toya & Hayes, 2017).
2.4.3. Resource distribution task
The distribution of stickers was recorded for each robot sep-
arately. To assess differences in number of donated stickers in
resource distribution task, distributional difference (DD) scores
were calculated by subtracting the number of stickers donated
to the robot without affective states from the number of stickers
donated to the robot with affective states. In the even (6 stickers)
trial, a DD score of zero thus represented an equal distribution,
while a positive score indicated that the robot with affective
states was favored and vice versa for a negative score. In the ad-
ditional uneven (5 stickers) trial, only positive or negative scores
could be obtained. The even and uneven versions of the task were
analyzed separately using one-way ANOVAs including the fac-
tors Anthropomorphic appearance (mechanical versus humanoid;
between-subjects) and Age (preschoolers versus second-graders;
between-subjects). Additionally, to assess whether the overall
difference scores in both trials were significantly different from
zero (i.e., whether resources were distributed equally or whether
one of the two recipients was favored), two one-sample t-tests
were conducted.
2.4.4. Anthropomorphism manipulation check
Each item in the anthropomorphism manipulation check re-
quired a binary response (‘‘yes’’ – 1 or ‘‘no’’ – 0). The clas-
sification item was also recorded as a binary response (0 for
teddy bear, 1 for child). A proportional average of all items was
calculated for each robot separately. This score ranged from 0 to 1
(αaffective robot = .76; αnon-affective robot = .97). Then, a mixed ANOVA
was conducted including the factors Affective states (robot with
affective states versus robot without affective states; within-
subjects), Anthropomorphic appearance (mechanical versus hu-
manoid; between-subjects), and Age (preschoolers versus second
graders; between-subjects) on the anthropomorphism scores.
3. Results
3.1. Anthropomorphism manipulation check
A significant main effect of Affective states was found, F (1,119)
= 293.95, p < .001, η2 = .71, 90% CI [.64, .76], showing
that participants attributed more anthropomorphic qualities to
the affective (M = .85 ±.19) than the non-affective robot (M
= .26 ±.32). A main effect of Age was also found, F(1,119) =
13.99, p < .001, η2 = .11, 90% CI [.03, .20] with older children
anthropomorphizing the robots (M = .50 ±.12) less than younger
children (M = .62 ±.21). Additionally, an interaction effect of Age
and Affective states was found, F(2,118) = 44.66, p < .001, η2 =
.43, 90% CI [.31, .51]. Second-graders attributed significantly more
anthropomorphic qualities to the affective robot than preschool-
ers (Mpreschool = .79 ±.20, Msecond−grade = .89 ±.17, t(109) = −2.76,
p = .007, d = 0.52, 90% CI [0.21, 0.85]), while preschoolers
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anthropomorphized the non-affective robot significantly more
than the second-graders (Mpreschool = .46 ±.34, Msecond−grade = .11
±.20, t(108) = 6.55, p < .001, d = 1.22, 90% CI [0.91, 1.60]), see
Fig. 3. No significant main effect of Anthropomorphic appearance,
nor any further significant interaction effects were found (all F ’s
< 2.44).
3.2. ERD scores
A significant main effect of Affective state attributions was
found, F (1,119) = 10.01, p = .002, η2 = .08, 90% CI [.02, .16],
showing that participants felt significantly more positive about
sharing with the robot with affective states (M = 0.47 ± 2.10)
than the robot without affective states (M = −0.09 ± 1.78). A
significant main effect of Age was also found, F(1,119) = 11.63,
p = .001, η2 = .09, 90% CI [.02, .18], with older children feeling
happier about sharing their resources rather than keeping it for
themselves (M = 0.65 ± 1.37), and younger children feeling
happier about keeping resources for themselves versus sharing
(M = −0.43 ± 1.93). No significant effect of Anthropomorphic
appearance, nor significant interaction effects were found (all F ’s
< 1.69). Thus, regardless of the robot’s appearance, children
felt happier about sharing with a robot that was described as
having affective states relative to sharing with a robot that was
not ascribed with affective states.
One-sample t-tests showed that, for preschoolers, ERD scores
for the robot without affective states were significantly lower
than zero (t(53) = −2.51, p = .015, d = −0.10, 90% CI [−0.32,
0.13]) while ERD scores for the robot with affective states did not
significantly differ from zero (t(48) = −0.71, p = .478, d = −0.36,
90% CI [−0.60, −0.11]). For second-graders, ERD scores for shar-
ing with the affective robot were positively significantly different
from 0 (t(62) = 4.26, p = .000, d = 0.54, 90% CI [0.31, 0.76]).
However, ERD scores did not significantly differ from 0 for the
robot without affective states (t(62) = 2.12, p = .038, d = 0.27,
90% CI [0.05, 0.48]). Thus, the main effect of our Affective state
manipulation manifested differently in the two age groups: while
second-graders felt significantly happier about sharing resources
rather than keeping them for themselves when the recipient was
a robot with affective states, this was not the case for the non-
affective robot. In contrast, while preschoolers felt significantly
more positive when keepings resources for themselves versus
sharing them when the robot did not have affective states, they
did not have such an experience when faced with the affective
robot (Fig. 3).
3.3. Mini dictator game
A significant main effect of Affective states was found, F (1,119)
= 4.58, p = .035, η2 = .04, 90% CI [.00; .11], showing that
participants shared significantly more stickers with the affective
robot (M = 2.05 ± 1.47) than the robot without affective states
(M = 1.78 ± 1.46), see Fig. 2. A main effect of Age was also found,
F(1,119) = 13.73, p < .001, η2 = .10, 90% CI [.03, .19] with older
children sharing significantly more resources (M = 2.30 ± 0.83)
than younger children (M = 1.43 ± 1.60). No significant effect of
Anthropomorphic appearance, nor significant interaction effects
were found (all F ’s < 0.67) (see Fig. 4).
3.3.1. Mediation
All mediation statistics (B and 90% CI) are reported in Fig. 5.
The results show that the mediation model indicates no direct
effect, a marginally significant total effect, and a significant indi-
rect effect. As ERD scores significantly reduced the direct effect
of Affective states on number of shared stickers in the mini
dictator game, these results provide some evidence that children’s
sharing with affective and non-affective robots is mediated by
their feelings about sharing with these robots. Children thus felt
relatively more positive about sharing resources with a robot that
they attributed affective states to, and this led them to share more
items with that robot as well.
3.4. Resource distribution task
No significant main effects of Age or Anthropomorphic appear-
ance were detected, nor an interaction effect — for either version
of the task (all F’s < 3.68). The results of the one-sample t-
test showed that, in the trial with an even number of resources,
overall difference scores were not significantly different from 0
(t(109) = 1.71, p = .091, d = 0.16, 90% CI [0.00, 0.32]; M
= 0.21 ± 1.29). Participants thus distributed resources equally
between the two robots. However, when participants were forced
to favor one of the two recipients in the trial with an uneven
number of resources, participants distributed significantly more
stickers to the robot with affective states compared to the robot
without affective states (t(48) = 2.45, p = .018, d = 0.35, 90% CI
[0.11, 0.59]; M = 0.47 ± 1.34).
4. Discussion
The current study explored whether and under which condi-
tions young children share their resources with a robot. More-
over, by systematically manipulating anthropomorphic affect at-
tributions and anthropomorphic appearance it explored the im-
pact of children’s understanding of others’ affective states and
appearance on the ontogeny of other-oriented behavior, and
whether their relative impact changes with age. Several tasks
were used to measure sharing behavior: a mini dictator game
to measure costly sharing behavior, a resource allocation task
to measure sharing behavior in a setting that was not costly to
the child herself, and an emotional judgment task to measure
children’s feelings about sharing. Results show that children
shared more with a robot they attributed with affective states in
the mini dictator game, distributed more resources towards this
robot in the resource allocation task, and that their emotional
judgments about sharing with this robot were more positive.
Thus, across tasks, children showed an increase in other-oriented
behavior towards the robot that was presented as having affective
states. This finding significantly extends upon the literature on
child–robot interaction, and contributes to a vivid discussion
on the psychological mechanisms that underlie young children’s
prosocial behavior (Dunfield, 2014; Eisenberg, 2000; Martin &
Olson, 2015) as it provides fundamental evidence for the role of
recipient affect in children’s sharing behavior in an experimen-
tally controlled design. In the following, we will describe these
results in more detail and discuss their theoretical and practical
implications.
4.1. Mini dictator game and emotional judgments
Regardless of age, children were found to share more of their
own costly resources with a robot that they ascribed affective
states to versus one that they did not anthropomorphize. This is
a remarkable finding in itself. While previous research has shown
that children anthropomorphize robots (e.g., Chernyak & Gary,
2016), learn from them, (Kory Westlund et al., 2017), imitate
them to some extent (Sommer et al., 2020), attribute goals to
their movements (Martin, Perry, et al., 2020), help them (Martin,
MacIntyre, et al., 2020), attribute moral concern to them to some
extent (Kahn et al., 2012; Sommer et al., 2019), and are influ-
enced by them in their decision-making (Vollmer, Read, Trippas,
& Belpaeme, 2018), this is the first time we have evidence of
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Fig. 2. Children in both age groups attributed more anthropomorphic qualities to the robot that was described as having affective states compared to the robot that
was introduced as having no emotional capacity, thus confirming the effect of our affective state manipulation.
Fig. 3. By subtracting the emotional rating of how children felt about sharing an item with each robot from their emotional rating of how they felt when allowed
to keep it for themselves, an Emotional Response Difference (ERD) score was calculated for each robot. In both age groups, children preferred sharing items with
the robot they attributed with affective states compared to the robot without emotional capacity.
children actually sharing their own costly resources with robots.
Our finding thus raises previous research – that largely focused on
the social-cognitive aspect of how children understand and think
about robots – to the level of how young children act prosocially
towards robots.
Children also felt happier about sharing with a robot that
they attributed with affective states than a robot they believed
to hold no emotional capacity. An exploratory mediation anal-
ysis further showed that children’s anticipated positive feelings
about sharing stickers with the affective versus non-affective
robot mediated their actual sharing behavior with the robots. No-
tably, second-graders (8–9 year olds) felt generally positive about
sharing relative to keeping items for themselves, and felt even
more positive when sharing with a robot that they attributed
affective states to. In contrast, preschoolers (4–5 year olds) in
our sample felt generally negative about sharing and felt more
positive about keeping items for themselves, but they felt less
negative about sharing with a robot they believed to have emo-
tions. This developmental contrast in children’s feelings about
sharing relative to the recipient’s ability for affect is remarkable
as, to our knowledge, such age differences have not been reported
previously in literature on the role of other’s affective states for
children’s own affect (e.g., Paulus & Moore, 2017).
Besides expanding on the domain of child–robot interaction,
our findings contribute to a vivid discussion on the basis of
prosocial behavior in childhood (e.g., Dunfield, 2014; Martin &
Olson, 2015; Paulus, 2018). By experimentally assessing the role
of specific psychological mechanisms (here: emotion attribution)
for sharing behavior, we managed to provide clear evidence for
the role of recipient affect in children’s sharing decisions beyond
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Fig. 4. While 8–9 year olds generally shared more stickers with the robots than 4–5 year olds, children in both age groups shared more with the robot they attributed
with affective states than with the robot without emotional capacity.
Fig. 5. An overview of the results of the mediation analysis.
empathy or the desire to alleviate negative affect — thus extend-
ing research on the relevance of emotion knowledge (Izard et al.,
2001) and showing that the ability of the recipient to experience
positive affect as a result of children’s sharing decisions directly
affects whether children share with the recipient or not.
4.2. Resource allocation task
Children were found to prefer an equal distribution of re-
sources in the non-costly resource allocation task. This is in line
with previous research on children’s preference for fair distribu-
tions: children typically prefer fair distributions (e.g., Fehr et al.,
2008; Shaw & Olson, 2012; Sloane, Baillargeon, & Premack, 2012).
While this is often interpreted as evidence for the developmental
roots of human altruism and egalitarianism, the fact that children
apparently also distribute resources evenly when a non-sentient
object is involved matches previous research that suggests that
children’s fairness preference rather stems from social or moral
norms (e.g., Blake, 2018; Kenward & Dahl, 2011; Olson & Spelke,
2008; Rakoczy et al., 2016). Our results suggest that these norms
are applied to a context without further considerations of the
differences between the recipients.
Moreover, when children in the current study were faced with
an uneven number of resources, they gave more resources to the
robot that they attributed with affective states compared to the
robot that was not attributed with affective states. This finding
strengthens the pattern of our results that children show more
other-oriented behavior towards a robot when they believe it is
able to feel.
Besides confirmatory findings, some exploratory findings
should be discussed as well. First, no effect of the robot’s human-
like appearance was found — while effects of human-like appear-
ance are present in the literature on interactions between adults
and robots (e.g., Nijssen, Heyselaar, Müller, & Bosse, 2020; Nijssen
et al., 2019). Perhaps, for children, appearance matters less and
their anthropomorphic beliefs are more dominant in determining
behavior towards a non-living object. In addition, perhaps in the
current study the affective state manipulation was more salient
to participants and the robot’s appearance thus did not affect
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their response as much. Research on children’s categorization of
group membership has shown that verbal information (as in our
affective manipulation) influence categorization more strongly
than visual information (as in our anthropomorphic appearance
manipulation; Baron, Dunham, Banaji, & Carey, 2014). Relatedly,
participants were only exposed to one robot type (humanoid or
mechanical) in a between-subjects design and the fact that they
had no contrast at the appearance level could have decreased
the salience of the anthropomorphic appearance of the robot
— although this is interesting in itself. Indeed, future research
should explore whether sharing behavior is affected by anthro-
pomorphic appearance when a mechanical and humanoid robot
are presented side by side.
Second, while it was not the focus of this study, we con-
sistently found that second-graders were more pro-social than
preschoolers — regardless of the affective state manipulation
of the anthropomorphic appearance of the robot. Thereby, we
replicate the well-established pattern that children become more
pro-social with age (e.g., Smith et al., 2013). In the emotional
judgment task, preschoolers rather kept resources for themselves
instead of sharing them, while second-graders rather shared re-
sources instead of keeping them for themselves. In the mini
dictator game, second-graders donated significantly more stick-
ers overall than preschoolers, and second-graders anthropomor-
phized robots to a lesser extent than preschoolers.
Lastly, while we hypothesized older children to be affected
more by our affective attribution manipulation, we only found
such an interaction effect for the anthropomorphic attribution
questionnaire — and not for emotional judgments about sharing
nor for sharing behavior in the mini dictator game and resource
distribution task. Interestingly, while preschoolers thus attribute
more anthropomorphic qualities than second-graders to a robot
that was described as being non-affective, the impact of our
manipulation on their sharing behavior towards the robot was the
same as for second-graders. This could be explained by a devel-
opmental difference between preschoolers and older children in
terms of expressiveness: perhaps preschoolers are affected by the
knowledge that a robot does (not) have affective states in terms
of their behavior, but they express this knowledge in a different
way; while second-graders can express their beliefs more clearly.
Regarding the lack of interaction effects for our other dependent
measures, this pattern of results goes against the Piagetian view
of anthropomorphism which holds that anthropomorphic beliefs
are universal in young children and decrease with age (Piaget
& Inhelder, 1969). Yet, the current findings fit with the model
of conceptual change of anthropomorphic beliefs (Carey, 1985;
Springer & Keil, 1989), which predicts that, regardless of age,
children may start off holding anthropomorphic beliefs about an
agent until they have sufficient contradictory evidence against
those beliefs; and update their beliefs accordingly. Updating be-
liefs may occur due to accumulating experience (e.g., through
age) or through top-down knowledge (e.g., through instruction).
In the current study, children were provided with top-down
knowledge about two robots and subsequently attributed affec-
tive states to one robot but not to the other. Children in both
age groups thus updated their beliefs, as evidenced by their
anthropomorphic attributions, and even adjusted their behavior
towards these robots accordingly. Importantly, our results thus
show that explicit knowledge about a non-living object directly
affects the way children relate to this object from as early as
preschool age.
It could be argued that the ecological validity of the study
is limited because children did not interact with a robot, and
instead only saw videos of robots. However, the majority of
research on children’s pro-social behavior does not involve a re-
cipient that is physically present: often, the recipient is a stranger
(e.g., Fehr et al., 2008; Moore, 2009), or represented by a photo-
graph (e.g., Baumard et al., 2012; Williams et al., 2014). Specif-
ically in the domain of child–robot interaction, videos or vi-
gnettes are often used in lieu of real-life interaction because it
allows for more control over children’s perceptions of the robot
(e.g., Danovitch & Keil, 2008; Sommer et al., 2019). Thus, when
interpreting our results in light of development of children’s pro-
social behavior and comparing these results to e.g., pro-social
behavior of other children, the fact that only videos and pictures
were used should not be of concern. Additionally, children’s shar-
ing behavior in this study could be biased by the presence of the
researcher. The presence of a researcher was unavoidable in the
experimental set-up of the study, yet we attempted to emphasize
children’s freedom to decide whether to share resources or not
as much as possible. Also, this study only investigated children’s
perceptions of robots on the short term. We emphasize that, in
order to know whether the effect of affective state attributions on
pro-social behavior persists over time, longitudinal research into
the relationship between children and robots is needed.
The interpretation of our results requires ethical consideration
as well. Our results, along with previous empirical studies of
child–robot interaction (e.g., Vollmer et al., 2018), show that
children’s perception of robots is easily modified — and this
perception has direct consequences for their behavior towards
robots. This modification requires more careful moral consider-
ation before such insights are implemented in the design and
programming of robots aimed for use by children. For example, it
has been argued that an emotional connection to an educational
robot improves learning outcomes (e.g., Björling, Emma, Andrew,
Rachel, & Dorothy, 2020). However, building such an emotional
connection requires deception regarding the emotional capacities
of the robot — just as in the current study. Extending this kind
of deception to an educational setting is problematic (Sharkey,
2016; Sharkey & Sharkey, 2020a). Children are a sensitive target
group, and parents, caregivers, and teachers have expressed con-
cerns over the ethical aspects of introducing robots in e.g., the
classroom or as caregivers (Sharkey & Sharkey, 2020b). While
noting potential learning benefits for children, parents and teach-
ers have voiced severe concerns about the implementation of
robots in the classroom including privacy, deception, and effects
on children’s socioemotional development (Serholt et al., 2017;
Smakman, Jansen, Leunen, & Konijn, 2020; van Ewijk, Smakman,
& Konijn, 2020). Such ethical considerations should thus be taken
into account before implementing the results of current research.
Overall, across emotional judgments, costly sharing, and re-
source distributions, our pattern of results adds to the literature:
not only do children already at preschool age attribute different
levels of affective experiences towards robots, but they also adjust
their pro-social behavior to those agents accordingly. Besides
theoretical implications in the domain of children’s pro-social
sharing behavior, our findings provide novel insight into how
children perceive robots: the way we present robots to chil-
dren directly influences their willingness to share resources with
them. In an age where children are increasingly likely to grow
up around robots, our findings clearly show that we should be
careful in how we present robots to our children — unless you
do not mind your child sharing their toys with your Roomba.
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